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TRIAL AND POST-CONVICTION REmzDIES
Indictrments-Burglary
The indictment must state "the essential facts constituting
the offense charged,"' and in burglary it is essential, even where
the specific (short) form is employed,2 to allege that the burglary
was of a "structure, watercraft or movable." The sacramental
nature of this element of the crime of burglary has long been
recognized. Thus, in State v. McDonalds a conviction was set
aside because the information alleging that the defendant had
burglarized "The American Hat Company, located at 810 Texas
Avenue" had not specifically alleged the breaking or entering of
a building or structure. This holding may have been unduly
technical, but technical construction of indictments is the rule,
and it was conceivable that the entry of the Hat Company prem-
ises might not have included the entry of a building or struc-
ture. In State v. Wright the Supreme Court of Louisiana refused
to extend the McDonald holding to a case where the short
form information charged "simple ... burglary of Rinaudo's
Red and White Grocery, located at 2532 Government Street."4
The issue was concisely and logically disposed of when Justice
Summers stated, ". . the bill of information before us connotes
very clearly, without using the word 'structure,' that a structure
was entered by referring to 'Rinaudo's Red and White Grocery,
located at 2532 Government Street.' The word 'grocery,' unlike
the term 'bar' or 'hat company,' is a generic term, which, by
definition, describes a structure or place more emphatically than
the word 'store' standing alone, because it describes a more par-
ticular type of store. It is, in other words, a special type of store,
which is invariably a structure of one kind or another." It may
be that a hyper-technical rule (McDonald) is being avoided by
a super-technical exception in Wright; but it was important, as
Justice Summers pointed out, that "defendants were not misled
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CODE CrIM. P. art. 464.
2. LA. CODE CRM. P. art. 465.
3. 178 La. 612, 615, 152 So. 308, 309 (1934).
4. 254 La. 521, 525-26, 225 So.2d 201, 202 (1969).
5. Id. at 538-39, 225 So.2d at 207.
[Vol. 31
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 371
to their prejudice."6 Also, it makes good sense to recognize the
fact that the word "grocery" contemplates a business conducted
in some sort of building or structure.
Conjunctive Charging and Allegations
Many crimes may be committed in more than one way, with
various acts, intents, and results, any of which is sufficient for
conviction, listed in the statutory definition of the offense. Fre-
quently the prosecution is not sure in advance of trial as to
which form of the crime will be established by the evidence.
In such a situation, article 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that the different possible acts, means, intents or results
may be set forth conjunctively (by "and") in the indictment or
in a bill of particulars. It further stipulates that "proof of any
one of the acts, means, intents or results, so set forth, will sup-
port a conviction."
In State v. Redden the bill of information had followed ar-
ticle 480 in charging that the defendants "actually and construc-
tively possessed and controlled a barbituate and a central nervous
system stimulant." (Emphasis supplied.) The Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that the defense was not entitled to force the
state, by interrogatories or a bill of particulars, to elect between
actual or constructive possession. After pointing out that it was
appropriate "to charge actual possession and constructive posses-
sion," the court stated, "[C]lassification of possession as actual or
constructive is often quite hazardous for the state in advance of
trial. The defendant, on the other hand, is fully advised by the
charge that he must be prepared to defend against both actual
and constructive possession."8 It was to meet the problem of
charging multifarious crimes, such as the narcotics law where
the exact form of the offense is frequently impossible to state
with precision in advance of trial, that the rule of article 480
was formulated; and, as Justice Sanders aptly concluded, the
bill of particulars "should not be converted into a trap for the
unwary."9 In State v. Pratt0 the defendant in an aggravated
rape case applied for a bill of particulars furnishing information
as to whether the state was going to prove that the victim's re-
6. Id. at 538, 225 So.2d at 207.
7. 255 La. 291, 292, 230 So.2d 817 (1970).
8. Id. at 294-95, 230 So.2d at 818.
9. Id. at 295, 230 So.2d at 818.
10. 255 La. 919, 233 So.2d 883 (1970).
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sistance had been overcome by force, or that the victim had
been prevented from resisting by threats of great and immediate
bodily harm." In its bill of particulars the state had stated that
it would show resistance to the utmost "and/or" prevention of
resistance by threats of great and immediate bodily harm. This
conjunctive/disjunctive answer was not in strict compliance with
the formula of article 480 which authorizes the bill of particulars
for a disjunctive crime to be phrased "conjunctively." In holding
that the bill of particulars was sufficient, the supreme court pointed
out that the defense had been fully notified that the state would
prove that the rape was accomplished by force and by threats,
and that it must be prepared to defend against both allegations.
This basis of the supreme court's holding was epitomized in Jus-
tice Hamlin's statement that, "We do not find a violation of the
conjunctive rule; the use of the word 'or' under the allegations
of the answer to the bill of particulars was superfluous."' 2 The
Pratt decision must be read and applied with caution. It is sub-
mitted that the purported distinction between Pratt and City of
Shreveport v. Bryson's is only a make-weight argument, and
would not have supported the holding in Pratt if the bill of par-
ticulars had simply used the disjunctive "or" which was held
insufficient in Bryson. Also, the formula of article 480, calling
for setting forth the charges or allegations "conjunctively"
should be followed, and the "and/or" form condoned in Pratt
should not be employed as a pattern for future indictments and
bills of particulars.
Defendant's Presence When Petit Jury Venireman
Excused by Judge
A defendant charged with a felony must be present "at the
calling, examination, challenging, impanelling and swearing of
the jury."'1 4 This requirement is an implementation of his right
to aid in the voir dire examination of prospective jurors. In State
v. McGuire15 the defendant was not present when the trial judge
examined members of the petit jury venire for the coming week
to ascertain whether they were qualified and available to serve.
At that time, he excused an uncle of the assistant district attor-
11. In either event the offense would have been aggravated rape under
LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950).
12. 255 La. 919, 927, 233 So.2d 883, 886 (1970).
13. 212 La. 534, 33 So.2d 60 (1947).
14. LA. CoDE CraM. P. art. 831 (3).
15. 254 La. 560, 225 So.2d 215 (1969).
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ney who was to prosecute cases during the week. In holding
that the defendant's right to be present during the jury selection
process had not been violated, the court pointed out that the
jurors had not been called for voir dire examination, but were
merely called in order that the judge could determine whether
an adequate number of qualified jurors were available for ser-
vice during the week. Thus no voir dire examination rights had,
or could have been, prejudiced by the defendant's absence. It is
only in the adversary jury selection process that the presence of
the defendant is of real significance; and, as Justice Hamlin ap-
propriately pointed out, to hold that the defendant's presence
was required when the judge is seeking to determine the quali-
fications and availability of the jurors on the petit jury venire
"would be to require that all defendants and their attorneys
must be present on the Monday of the trial week, regardless of
which day their trial was scheduled for, or, the equally ridiculous
requirement that all jurors summoned for duty during any given
trial week, be required to re-appear in court each day to ascer-
tain their qualifications, regardless of whether or not they had
been previously determined to be unqualified. This would be
an absurd result."'
Witherspoon Limitation upon Challenge of Jurors with
Conscientious Scruples Against Capital Punishment
The United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois 7
held an Illinois procedure unconstitutional which permitted the
state to challenge prospective jurors in capital cases for cause if
they had conscientious scruples against capital punishment. A
jury thus selected, according to the Supreme Court, did not rep-
resent a fair cross-section of the community. 8 In 1968 the Lou-
isiana legislature amended article 798 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, in conformity with the United States Supreme Court's
footnote suggestion in Witherspoon, and authorized the challenge
of a juror with conscientious scruples against capital punishment
if he made it "unmistakably clear (a) that he would automatical-
ly vote against the imposition of capital punishment without
16. Id. at 567, 225 So.2d at 217.
17. 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968), noted in Note, 29 LA. L. Rzv. 381 (1969).
18. Mr. Justice Stewart stated that by eliminating all Jurors who had
conscientious or religious scruples against capital punishment, "the State
crossed the line of neutrality. In its quest for a jury capable of Imposing
the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to con-
demn a man to die." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1968).
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regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial
.... " (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be noted that the Witherspoon formula permits in-
terrogation of prospective jurors as to their attitude about capital
punishment-to the end that those who could never render a
capital verdict, regardless of the evidence, may give rise to chal-
lenges for cause.
Two 1969-1970 cases, where capital convictions were upheld,
point the way to the care which must be exercised, and the role
of the trial judge, in determining that a juror is so unalterably
opposed to the rendering of a capital verdict that he is subject
to a challenge for cause by the state.19 In one of these cases,
State v. Poland, the court made an appropriate footnote obser-
vation "that Louisiana accords an accused a similar right to
challenge for cause any juror who entertains a prejudice against
rendering a qualified verdict, the converse of the situation
here. '20 The form of such correlative questioning, in view of the
strict limitation on the state's right to challenge jurors with
scruples against capital punishment, may raise some nice ques-
tions.
Prior Notice of Confession or Inculpatory Statement
The 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure provided an entirely
new approach to the requirement of notice that a confession or
other inculpatory statement would be introduced at the trial.
The former Louisiana jurisprudence had held that if a corifes-
sion was not announced in the opening statement, it could not
be used as evidence. 21 Some questions had been presented as to
how detailed the opening statement specification should be. If
a confession was read to the jury in the opening statement and
later ruled inadmissible, reversible error had been committed. 22
There had been no such ruling where the inadmissible confes-
sion was merely specified in the opening statement, although
even the mention was inevitably damaging to the defendant.
The new 1966 procedure solved this dilemma in a fair and prac-
19. State v. Poland, 255 La. 746, 763-66, 232 So.2d 499, 506 (1970); State v.
Williams, 255 La. 79, 229 So.2d 706 (1969).
20. 255 La. 746, 766 n. 8, 232 So.2d 499, 507 n. 8 (1970). State v. Weston, 232
La. 766, 95 So.2d 305 (1957); State v. Jackson, 227 La. 642, 80 So.2d 105 (1955);
State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940).
21. State v. Palmer, 227 La. 691, 80 So.2d 374 (1955).
22. State v. Cannon, 184 La. 514, 166 So. 485 (1936).
[Vol. 31
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 375
tical way. Article 767 prohibits any reference to a confession or
inculpatory statement in the district attorney's opening state-
ment. Article 768 requires the State to advise the defense in
writing prior to the opening statement of its intention to intro-
duce the confession, thus satisfying the notice requirement even
more fully than reference in the opening statement would-have
done. Failure to give such notice, even though there may have
been a prior ruling on the motion to suppress, renders the con-
fession or inculpatory statement inadmissible in evidence.2
In State v. Fink24 the supreme court held that the term "in-
culpatory statement," as used in articles 767 and 768, "refers to
the out-of-court admission of incriminating facts made by a de-
fendant after the crime has been committed. '25 (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Applying this definition, the court held that it was not
necessary to give prior written notice of the fact that the state
intended to introduce incriminating evidence of prior conversa-
tions with officers wherein the defendant made arrangements to
sell marijuana to them. The negotiations with the officers, not
being considered as an "inculpatory statement," had been prop-
erly mentioned in the state's opening statement. The phrase "in-
culpatory statement" if found alone, would normally be defined
as broadly synonomous with "incriminatory statement. '28 How-
ever, since the phrase is coupled with "confessions," it was logical
to color and limit its meaning by the more restrictive word with
which it is associated.Y
The importance of the Fink decision is that it settles the
procedure to be followed where incriminating statements are to
be introduced at the trial. When the statements are confessions
or other inculpatory admissions made after the crime, the pro-
cedures of articles 767 and 768 must be followed. When state-
ments which tend to incriminate the defendant were made be-
23. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703, comment (f).
24. 255 La. 385, 231 So.2d 360 (1970).
25. Id. at 390, 231 So.2d at 362.
26. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 908 (4th ed. 1951), states the following general
definition: "Inculpatory. In the law of evidence. Going or tending to estab-
lish guilt; intended to establish guilt; criminative."
27. J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION t§ 4908 (1943).
"In case the legislative intent is not clear, the meaning of doubtful words
may be determined by reference to their association with other associated
words and phrases. Thus when two or more words are grouped together, and
ordinarily have a similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the
general word will be limited and qualified by the special word."
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fore the crime, they must be specified in the state's opening state-
ment of the evidence to be submitted at the trial.
State v. Anderson held that the notice requirement of article
'768 was sufficiently satisfied by a statement that the state in-
tended to introduce "each and every confession and statement
of each and everyone of these defendants, whether same be oral
or recorded (and later transcribed into writing) or written...."2
Only some of the statements were described in detail. In so hold-
ing, Justice Sanders stated that the notice given "apprises the
defendants of the State's intention to introduce oral confessions
and statements. The notice in our opinion substantially complies
with Article 768 .... 2
Exclusion of Witnesses-Effect of
Violation of Exclusion Order
Sequestration of witnesses prior to their being called to the
stand to testify is an important device for exposing and refuting
combinations to falsify. Thus, under article 764 of the 1966 Code
of Criminal Procedure the exclusion of witnesses is demandable
.,by either the state or the defendant as a matter of right.80 It is
not necessary that the moving party show why he needs the ex-
clusion, for the ever-present chance of exposing perjury is suf-
ficient. When exclusion is ordered, the witnesses are removed
from the courtroom and are usually placed in the custody of a
deputy sheriff, with orders not to return until they are called to
testify and to "refrain from discussing the facts of the case or
the testimony of any witness with anyone other than the district
attorney or defense counsel."'81 Of course, the primary purpose
of such instruction, and it is well for the court to specifically in-
clude this in its instruction to the excluded witnesses, is that they
shall not discuss the case with other witnesses.
In State v. Coleman3 2 the supreme court provides a logical
and clear exposition of the effects of a violation by the witnesses
of a court's exclusion order. Two doctors, who had been excluded
and apparently instructed pursuant to article 764, had inadver-
28. 254 La. 1107, 1133-34, 229 So.2d 329, 338 (1969).
29. Id. at 1134, 229 So.2d at 338-39, reaffirming the Supreme Court's prior
holding in State v. Palmer, 251 La. 759, 206 So.2d 485 (1968).
30. LA. CODI PEUM. P. art. 764 states that "upon request of the state or the
defendant the court shall order that the witnesses be excluded ... ." (Em-
phasis supplied.)
81. LA. CODS CzuM. P. art. 764.
82. 254 La. 264, 223 So.2d 402 (1969).
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tently entered into a discussion concerning a medical issue in
the case. In upholding the trial judge's refusal to disqualify the
witnesses, the supreme court pointed out that the conversation
was strictly inadvertent and did not affect the doctors' testimony.
The appeal could have been disposed of under the general "harm-
less error" provision of the Code.88 However, the supreme court
posited its decision on a much broader base. Justice Summers
stressed a change brought about by article 764 of the 1966 Code.
The former codal provision had expressly provided for disquali-
fication of witnesses who disobeyed a sequestration order.8 4 How-
ever, except where there had been connivance with the litigant,
the penalty of disqualification had been largely eroded by the
jurisprudence. Article 764 of the 1966 Code had therefore, as
the Reporter's Comment indicated,8 deleted the provision for
disqualification of a witness who disobeyed the court's order.
The complainant's remedy, as pointed out by Justice Summers,86
was to present evidence of the improper conversation to the
jury and to use it to attack the credibility of the witnesses' testi-
mony. Also, as was pointed out in both the Code comment and
Justice Summer's opinion, the trial judge was authorized "in his
discretion, to punish the witness for contempt for the disobedi-
ence."8 Such punishment would not have been appropriate under
the Coleman facts.
While article 764 advisedly omitted the automatic disquali-
fication provision of the 1928 Code, the court would still have
authority to disqualify a witness who violated an exclusion order
with "the consent, connivance, procurement or knowledge" of
the party for whom he was to testify.8 If the discussion in Cole-
man had been of a more significant nature it might have been
argued that, since the doctors were conversing in the presence of
the district attorney, their disqualification as prosecuting wit-
nesses was called for.
Double Jeopardy-Victim Dies after Conviction
of Attempted Murder
Article 596 of the 1966 Code, which provides a general state-
ment of the scope of the double jeopardy concept, recognizes
33. LA. CODO CRIM. P. art. 921.
34. Formerly, LA. R.S. 15:371 (1928).
35. See LA. CODs Caum. P. art 764, comment (b).
86. 254 La. 264, 269, 223 So.2d 402, 403 (1969).
37. Id.
38. See Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1967).
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double jeopardy in a second trial where the charge in that trial
is "(1) Identical with or a different grade of the same offense
for which the defendant was in jeopardy at the first trial,
whether or not a responsive verdict could have been rendered
in the first trial as to the charge in the second trial; . . ." (Em-
phasis supplied.) The concluding clause of the above statement
makes it abundantly clear that double jeopardy is not limited by
responsive verdict restrictions. Thus, where the state chooses
to prosecute for a lesser degree of the crime, it would normally
not be permitted to subsequently prosecute for the major crime.
For example, a prosecution for negligent homicide or manslaugh-
ter would bar a subsequent trial for murder, even though a
murder verdict would not have been responsive to either of those
lesser charges.
A different situation was presented in State v. Poland9
where the defendant had pleaded guilty of attempted murder and
had been sentenced. The victim subsequently died, and the de-
fendant was indicted and brought to trial for murder. The de-
fendant argued that murder and attempted murder were "dif-
ferent grades of the same offense" within the meaning of article
596 (1). This contention was further bolstered by a provision in
the general attempt article of the Criminal Code that an attempt
is a "lesser grade of the intended crime."4 In holding that the
double jeopardy plea had been properly overruled, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana followed a well-established and logical line
of jurisprudence and legal authorities.4 1 The most persuasive
and logical reason for holding that the defendant had not been
in jeopardy as to murder when he pleaded guilty of attempted
murder was the fact that the murder was not complete and could
not have been prosecuted when the attempted murder plea was
entered. Chief Justice Fournet quoted with approval from a
United States Supreme Court holding: "The death of the injured
person was the principal element of the homicide, but was no
part of the assault and battery. At the time of the trial for the
latter the death had not ensued, and not until it did ensue was
the homicide committed. Then, and not before, was it possible
to put the accused in jeopardy for that offense." 42
39. 255 La. 746, 232 So.2d 499 (1970).
40. LA. R.S. 14:27 (1950).
41. 255 La. 746, 752, 232 So.2d 499, 501-02 (1970).
42. Id. at 753, 232 So.2d at 502, quoting from Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442, 449 (1912).
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Jury Trial for Serious Misdemeanors
The 1968 Legislature, in order to square Louisiana penalties
and procedures with the apparent petty offense line of Duncan,
adopted two important statutes. Act 647 reduced the penalties of
a number of misdemeanors to a fine of not over $500.00 or a
prison sentence of not more than six months, or both. Act 635
amended article 779 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so as to
provide a tribunal for misdemeanor trials which would conform
with Duncan standards. It provided for a five man jury where
the misdemeanor charged was punishable by "a fine in excess
of five hundred dollars or imprisonment for more than six
months." In State v. Seals" the defendant was charged with ille-
gal carrying of weapons44 for which the 1968 penalty revision stat-
ute had fixed a maximum penalty of $500.00, or six months impris-
onment, or both. Defense counsel argued that the possible penalty,
which was similar to numerous other penalties which had been
reduced by Act 647 of 1968, exceeded $500.00 or six months im-
prisonment and that he was thus entitled to a jury trial under
amended article 779.
In rejecting defense counsel's claim to a jury trial, the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana construed the 1968 statutes in pari
materia and concluded that the phrase "or both," which was con-
sistently used by Act 647 in conformity with the federal "petty
offense" line, had probably been inadvertently omitted in the
amendment of article 779 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The court was thus giving effect to the overall 1968 legislative
intent in holding that the penalty for illegal carrying of weapons
did not call for a jury trial under article 779.
The supreme court made it clear however, that its decision
was also posited on another and even more explicit base, i.e., a
construction of the language of amended article 779 itself.45 Jus-
tice Hamiter stressed the fact that the offense charged could not
be punished by a fine in excess of $500.00, or by imprisonment
in excess of six months, and concluded, "We believe that the
true intent of the Legislature was that so long as the fine im-
43. 255 La. 1005, 233 So.2d 914 (1970).
44. LA. R.S. 14:95 (1968).
45. Amended article 779 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads, ".
misdemeanor in which the punishment may be a ftne in excess of five hun-
dred dollars or imprisonment for more than six months ... " (Emphasis
supplied.)
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posed under a criminal statute does not exceed $500.00 and the
jail sentence does not exceed six months, a jury trial is not man-
datory under Article 779 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.""
It is submitted that the true legislative intent, and a very bene-
ficial practical result, was achieved in the Seal decision.
Mistrial--Comments Concerning Other Crimes
The 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure provides more com-
plete guidelines as to the effect of prejudicial remarks made be-
fore the jury. Article 770, which follows lines established by the
jurisprudence, embraces remarks by the court, the district at-
torney or any court official which are so highly prejudicial that
they cannot be adequately cured by an admonition from the
court. In these situations the defendant is entitled to a mistrial,
unless he prefers that the court admonish the jury and proceed
with the trial. The second ground for a mistrial is reference to
"another crime committed or alleged to have been committed
by the defendant as to which evidence is not admissible." In
State v. Kreller47 the defendant was charged with sale of nar-
cotics, and the district attorney outlined a separate subsequent
narcotics sale in his opening statement.48 In approving the pros-
ecution's reference to the subsequent narcotics sale, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana pointed out that such evidence was admis-
sible, under LA. R.S. 15:445 and 15:446, for the purpose of show-
ing system, intent and guilty knowledge. Kreller followed the
supreme court's previous holding 9 that the exception allowing
proof of other similar crimes applied "not only to prior criminal
offenses committed by the defendant, but also to offenses com-
mitted subsequent to the offense charged."8 0 (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
Companion article 771 covers other irrelevant prejudicial
remarks where a prompt admonition by the court will generally
be sufficient to assure the defendant of a fair trial. It embraces
remarks by a witness or other person which would be a ground
for an automatic mistrial under article 770 if made by the court
46. State v. Seals, 255 La. 1005, 1016-17, 233 So.2d 914, 918 (1970).
47. 255 La. 982, 233 So.2d 906 (1970).
48. LA. CODs CalM. P. art. 769 states: "Evidence not fairly within the
scope of the opening statement of the state shall not be admitted in evi-
dence."
49. State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24 (1955).
50. 255 La. 982, 992, 233 So.2d 906, 909 (1970).
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or district attorney. Remarks by witnesses do not have the same
weight with jurors as do official statements. Also, witnesses
cannot be fully controlled and there is not the same official
responsibility for their utterances. In these situations judicial
admonition is the normal remedy. In State v. Arena5l a police
officer, who was testifying in a bad check case as to serving
notice of the checks being dishonored, spontaneously stated that
he had recognized the defendant as a person previously arrested.
It was obvious that the district attorney was as surprised by the
utterance as was the defense. Thus the case was one where the
normal remedy of an admonition to disregard the remark was
sufficient. The prejudice was not so great as to require drastic




In Brown v. Collin.' an issue arose as to whether plaintiffs
in a personal injury suit had been guilty of contributory negli-
gence by riding with a driver whom they allegedly knew was
under the influence of intoxicating beverages. In order to estab-
lish the driver's state of inebriation, evidence had been intro-
duced that the alcoholic content of his blood was .255 mg. percent.
There was, however, no expert testimony as to the significance
of this datum, nor had blood-alcohol charts been introduced in
evidence. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal took the position
that "this is a matter of scientific opinion of which the judge
may not take judicial notice,"2 concluding that no weight could
be given to the evidence of alcoholic content. With deference,
it seems to this writer that some weight could properly have
been given to the evidence. This was a case tried to a judge
alone, and one of the advantages in judge-tried cases is that a
judge is normally more competent to weigh and evaluate evi-
dence than an untrained juror. A scientific chart was readily
51. 254 La. 858, 223 So.2d 832 (1969).
52. After stating the normal relief by way of a prompt admonition to thejury to disregard, LA. CODS CmM. P. art. 771 concludes that "the court may
grant a mistrial if it is satisfied that an admonition is not sufficient to assure
the defendant a fair trial."
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 223 So.2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
2. Id. at 456.
